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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of aggravated rob-
bery, one count of brandishing a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, and ~ 
one count of interference with arresting officer (although the Court did not 
sentence Mr. Bell for the interference count) in Third Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)G). The judgment is attached hereto as Addendum 
A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Whether Mr. Bell's trial counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance or the district court committed plain error when Mr. Bell was convicted 
of two counts of aggravated robbery for behavior should have given rise to on-
ly one count under the single larceny doctrine. 
Standard of Review: A plain error claim and an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correct-
ness. See Carter v. State, 2012 UT 69, <][ 9, 289 P.3d 542; State v. Smit, 2004 
UT App 222, <][ 7, 95 P.3d 1203. 
Issue 2: Whether Mr. Bell's trial counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance when Mr. Bell was convicted of aggravated robbery of a vehicle that Q 
was impossible for him to steal. 
1 
Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised 
for the first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. See Carter v. State, 
~ 2012 UT 69, <J[ 9, 289 P.3d 542; State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, <J[ 7, 95 P.3d 
1203. 
;' :: .. \ 
\IV 
Issue 3: Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Bell of 
having the necessary intent to commit aggravated robbery despite his de-
fense of voluntary intoxication. 
Standard of Review: The Court reverses based on a sufficiency of evi-
dence challenge only if, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party, [it] conclude[s] that the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the verdict." Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, <J[ 33, 
31 P.3d 557. 
Preservation: It does not appear from the record that Mr. Bell pre-
served his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review of an Unpreserved Issue: 
The Court may review this issue through Mr. Bell's claim that his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Dupont, 2002 UT App 
378, at *1 n.2 (unpublished). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes can be found in 
AddendumB. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 
Utah Code§ 76-2-306 
Utah Code§ 76-4-101 
Utah Code§ 76-4-102 
Utah Code § 76-6-301 
Utah Code § 76-6-302 
Utah Code § 76-6-404 
Utah Code § 76-6-404.5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts 
On Saturday, May 5, 2013, three women-Moriah Aragon, Brenda 
Ruiz, and Kendra Christensen-drove to a store to shop for a cell phone. R. 
124 at 81-82. The women drove in a car owned by Ms. Ruiz. R. 124 at 82-83, 
105. Although Ms. Ruiz owned the car, she let Ms. Aragon drive, while Ms. 
Ruiz sat in the front passenger seat. R. 124 at 82-83, 105. When the women 
arrived at the store, Ms. Ruiz left her purse on the car floor near the front GI 
passenger seat of the car and went in the store. R. 124 at 106. When they 
3 
went in the store, Ms. Aragon kept the keys to Ms. Ruiz's car in her posses-
sion. R. 124 at 84-85. The women left the keys to a different rental car in the 
;.if) cup holder of Ms. Ruiz's car. R. 124 at 84-85. While inside the store, they en-
countered defendant Bryce Bell and saw him acting somewhat strangely. R. 
124 at 87-88. Mr. Bell left the store before the women did. R. 124 at 89, 123. 
After Mr. Bell left the store, observers saw him looking into other cars 
in the parking lot and trying to open the doors. R. 124 at 156, 171-172, 177-
178. Subsequently, the three women looked out the store window and saw 
Mr. Bell sitting in the driver's seat of Ms. Ruiz's car. R. 124 at 89, 123. The 
women approached the car and saw Mr. Bell holding the rental car keys and 
asking where the ignition was located. R. 124 at 90, 110, 123. Mr. Bell asked 
where the ignition was about three or four times, but he never found the igni-
tion. R. 124 at 111, 125. The keys that Mr. Bell was holding were not the 
keys to Ms. Ruiz's car and could not be used to start the car he was sitting in. 
R. 124 at 106. 
Ms. Aragon opened the driver's side door and shouted for Mr. Bell to 
leave the car. R. 124 at 90-91, 124-125. The other women also shouted for 
Mr. Bell to leave the car. R. 124 at 111. Mr. Bell eventually responded by 
pulling out a knife and pointing it at Ms. Aragon. R. 124 at 91, 111, 125. Ms. 
4 
Aragon stepped away from the car after seeing the knife. R. 124 at 92, 111. 
After Ms. Aragon stepped away, Mr. Bell turned and pointed the knife at Ms. 
Ruiz, who was standing next to the passenger side door. R. 124 at 94, 111-
112. Ms. Ruiz remained standing where she was. R. 124 at 95, 112. Mr. Bell 
never lunged at Ms. Aragon or Ms. Ruiz, and the knife never injured or even G;> 
touched either of the women. R. 124 at 100-101, 119, 130-131. Mr. Bell then 
picked up Ms. Ruiz's purse from the floor near the front passenger seat of the 
car and exited the car. R. 124 at 95, 112, 126, 145. 
After leaving the car, Mr. Bell dropped the knife and left it near the cell 
phone store. R. 124 at 148. Mr. Bell then ran across the parking lot with the 
women and an employee of the store following him. R. 124 at 95-96, 113, 127, 
136, 146. Two onlookers in a car attempted to block Mr. Bell with the car and <iJ 
managed to dislodge the purse from him. R. 124 at 96, 113, 127, 156, 172-
173. They bumped Mr. Bell at least twice with the car, causing him to fall. 
R. 124 at 157-158. At one point, Mr. Bell asked the person in the car who 
bumped him for a ride, but was refused. R. 124 at 158. Without the purse, 
Mr. Bell got up and continued running across the parking lot. R. 124 at 96, 
113, 127, 136, 157, 173. Ms. Ruiz picked up her purse and continued running 
after Mr. Bell. R. 124 at 114. Subsequently, Mr. Bell dropped the rental car 
5 
~ 
keys in nearby bushes. R. 124 at 128-129; R. 125 at 18. Mr. Bell was even-
tually stopped and apprehended by the police. R. 124 at 96-97, 114, 128; R. 
125 at 13-14. All of Ms. Ruiz's belongings were returned to her. R. 124 at 
115. According to a police detective, Mr. Bell later stated that he had tried to 
take a car. R. 125 at 32, 34. The whole episode lasted a few minutes at most. 
R. 124 at 156, 178, 192. 
Mr. Bell was under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the incident 
at issue. He testified that he was not sober at the time. R. 125 at 48. When 
walking in the parking lot prior to the incident involving the purse, Mr. Bell 
fell down at least twice. R. 124 at 180. R. 124 at 99-101, 152. He looked like 
a 'junkie" in bad physical condition, according to the witness who bumped 
Mr. Bell with his car and spoke to him. R. 124 at 160. Inside the store, he 
was talking loudly, arguing with the store manager, using excessive amounts 
of hand sanitizer, repeatedly lifting up his shirt, and talking to himself. R. 
124 at 100-102, 107-108, 122, 151. When Mr. Bell left the store, he kicked 
the door open rather than opening it normally. R. 124 at 102, 108, 122. 
When Mr. Bell ran, he was wobbling. R. 124 at 102. When Mr. Bell held up 
his hand as if to show something to the store manager, there was nothing in 
6 
his hand. R. 124 at 153. He acted erratically and was "all over the place." R. 
124 at 160, 180, 189. 
After being arrested, Mr. Bell told police officers that he was on meth-
amphetamine and that he had not slept for three days. R. 125 at 23. Mr. 
Bell answered questions clearly but was moaning while doing so. R. 125 at 
24-25. Mr. Bell vomited at the police station and was eventually taken to the 
hospital. R. 125 at 23-24, 32-33. The police detective had Mr. Bell sent to the 
hospital because he believed the jail would not accept Mr. Bell in his condi-
tion. R. 125 at 32-33. Immediately after the events at issue took place, Mr. 
Bell had no memory of going to the cell phone store or of any of the events in-
volving the car, knife, and purse. R. 125 at 46-47. 
While at the cell phone store, Mr. Bell interacted with a store employee 
and was understandable and responded coherently to questions. R. 124 at 
141-143. The store employee did not smell alcohol while speaking with Mr. 
Bell, but the store employee believed Mr. Bell was high. R. 124 at 151-152. 
While Mr. Bell did not recall anything about the alleged crimes, he did re-
member some details about conversations with a friend beforehand, about 
drinking a beer beforehand, and going to the location where the crimes at is-
sue were alleged to take place. R. 125 at 49-50. He also remembered the tat-
7 
too of a hospital worker who attended to him after the police took him for 
medical attention. R. 125 at 46-47. 
Statement of Proceedings 
On May 8, 2013, the District Attorney for Salt Lake County filed an in-
formation charging Mr. Bell with five crimes: two counts of aggravated rob-
bery, two counts of aggravated assault, and interference with an arresting of-
ficer. R. 1. At a preliminary hearing on June 20, 2013, one of the aggravated 
assault counts was stricken, but Mr. Bell was bound over for trial on the four 
remaining counts. R. 23. The prosecution subsequently filed an amended in-
formation reflecting the removal of one count of aggravated assault. R. 33. A 
jury trial was held on October 8 and 9, 2013. R. 77-81. The jury found Mr. 
~ Bell guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of brandishing a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel (a lesser included offense of aggravat-
ed assault), and one count of interference with an arresting officer. R. 85; R. 
125 at 90. On December 2, 2013, the district court sentenced Mr. Bell to two 
prison terms of five years to life, and one term of less than a year, with the 
terms to run concurrently (the court did not sentence Mr. Bell to any time for 
interference with an arresting officer). R. 105-06, 132-33; R. 126 at 14-15. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A jury convicted Mr. Bell of two counts of aggravated robbery when the 
facts at issue only allow one count. Pursuant to the single larceny doctrine, G;:; 
the Court should have instructed the jury that it could consider convicting 
Mr. Bell of, at most, one count of aggravated robbery. 
The criminal episode involving Mr. Bell lasted only a few minutes. Act-
ing on one impulse, he was accused of entering a car that was not his, bran-
dishing a knife when confronted, then exiting the car with a purse that was 
inside (without ever starting the car or driving it anywhere). Mr. Bell 
dropped the purse and was arrested shortly thereafter. There was a single 
victim, a single location, and no lapse of time between the events. Yet the 
prosecution still charged Mr. Bell with two counts of aggravated robbery- g 
one for the car and one for the purse. The district court instructed the jury 
on both counts, and Mr. Bell's trial counsel did not object. Established law 
dictates that the episode only justified one count, and it was both plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel to allow two counts. The harm to Mr. 
Bell is obvious and drastic-the jury convicted on both counts, he has two 
first-degree felonies on his record, and his prison time increased dramatical-
ly. 
9 
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Even if the facts gave rise to two separate criminal charges (which they 
did not), Mr. Bell should not have been charged with and convicted of aggra-
vated robbery of the car. It was literally impossible for Mr. Bell to take the 
car because he never had the keys to it. He had no way to turn on the car, 
and he never took it anywhere. Utah law allows a defense of factual impossi-
bility for aggravated robbery, but Mr. Bell's trial counsel did not present or 
argue such a defense. It was ineffective assistance of counsel to not make a 
defense that should have eliminated one of the charges. 
Finally, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr. 
i-i> Bell had the requisite intent to commit either count of aggravated robbery 
due to his voluntary intoxication. Multiple witnesses establish that Mr. Bell 
did not have control of his actions and did not have the ability to form the in-
tent to commit aggravated robbery. Mr. Bell had taken drugs and alcohol 
and has no memory of any of the events at issue. Even the evidence relied on 
by the prosecution actually demonstrates Mr. Bell's impaired state. After be-
ing confronted while sitting in the car, Mr. Bell asked the car owner where 
the ignition was located. Later, while running away, Mr. Bell was bumped 
several times by a moving car driven by an onlooker attempting to stop him . 
.;;) After being bumped, Mr. Bell asked the driver for a ride. This is not the be-
10 
havior of a person acting rationally. Mr. Bell was asking questions and seek-
ing help from people yelling at him and hitting him with a car. Mr. Bell was 
so intoxicated that he did not comprehend basic facts. Accordingly, the ag- Q 
gravated robbery convictions should not stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS WRONG TO CONVICT MR. BELL OF TWO COUNTS OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The criminal episode involving Mr. Bell lasted for a few minutes at the 
most. He got in a car, looked unsuccessfully for the ignition, showed a knife 
when confronted, exited the car with a purse, and ran. Regardless of whether 
he had the requisite criminal intent (addressed below), Mr. Bell's actions did 
not give rise to two first-degree felonies. Mr. Bell was charged with and con-
victed of two counts of aggravated robbery-one for attempting to take the 
car (even though this was impossible, also addressed below), and one for tak-
ing the purse. Because there was one criminal episode and one victim, the @ 
single larceny doctrine dictates that only one aggravated robbery count was 
allowed. The second count must be vacated. 
A. The Facts Only Give Rise to One Criminal Count. 
Under both the ineffective assistance of counsel standard and the plain 
error standard, Mr. Bell experienced harm and prejudice. See State v. 
11 
McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, 'Il 42, 302 P.3d 844. ("Under either theory, a de-
fendant must demonstrate that, absent the error or deficient performance, 
~ there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result."). The jury con-
victed Mr. Bell of two first degree felonies, while the law dictates that he 
should have been, at most, convicted of one. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution applies 
against the States. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause embodies three separate protections: (1) protec-
tion against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) pro-
;;p tection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 
(3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Bernat v. 
Allphin, 2005 UT 1, <JI 11, 106 P.3d 707, as corrected (Apr. 1, 2005) (citing 
Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1984)). The 
third of these three protections-"multiple punishments for the same of-
fense"-is at issue here. 
To prevent "multiple punishments for the same offense," most jurisdic-
tions, including Utah, have adopted what is known as the "single larceny doc-
trine." 37 A.L.R.3d 1407 (1971) ("The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
.::;, follow ... the so-called 'single larceny doctrine."'). This doctrine, as explained 
12 
by the Utah Supreme Court more than 100 years ago, holds that "[w]here 
many articles are stolen at one time, there is only one theft, whether the 
ownership is one or many." State v. Mickel, 65 P. 484, 485 (Utah 1901). Utah Q 
courts have on several occasions reaffirmed this doctrine, holding that "a sin-
gle larcenous taking of property, whether owned by one or several individu-
als, will be treated as a single criminal offense."1 State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 
694, 695 (Utah 1981); State v. Kimbrel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980); see al-
so State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, <J[<J[ 13-15, 299 P.3d 625. 
In applying this doctrine, the "crucial consideration [is] the intent of the 
thief." Kimbrel, 620 P.2d at 518. Thus, 
the general test as to whether there are separate of-
fenses or one offense is whether the evidence disclos-
es one general intent or discloses separate and dis-
tinct intents. The particular facts and circumstances 
of each case determine this question. If there is but 
one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, 
even though there is a series of transactions, there is 
but one offense. 
Id. To Mr. Bell's knowledge, no Utah court has described the factors relevant 
to determining whether the "evidence discloses" that just "one offense" has 
1 The "underlying purpose and policy" of this doctrine is twofold: to (1) "pre-
vent the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single act," and (2) to "resolve 
doubts in the enforcement of the penal code against the imposition of a 
harsher punishment." State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1981). 
13 
been committed, but the Virginia Court of Appeals has noted that factors to 
consider include, among others, "the location of the items stolen, the lapse of 
vJ time between their taking, the general and specific intent of the thief, the 
number of owners, and whether intervening events occurred between the tak-
ings." See Richardson v. Commonwealth, 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Va. Ct. App. 
1997). 
This Court invoked this rule and applied some of these factors to inval-
~ 
idate one of two aggravated robbery offenses in State v. Irvin, 2007 UT App 
319, 169 P.3d 798. There, the defendant approached the counter at a conven-
~ ience store and asked the store clerk for a pack of cigarettes and a cigar. 
When the clerk turned around to retrieve the items, the defendant came 
around the counter, brandished a knife, and ordered the clerk to turn over 
the contents of the cash register. Id. <JI 2. At about the same time, the de-
fendant demanded the keys to the clerk's car. Id. After locking the clerk in a 
back room, the defendant left the convenience store in the clerk's car. The 
defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. 
On appeal, this Court vacated one of defendant's two aggravated rob-
bery convictions. As the Court explained, "[t]he facts and circumstances of 
i.iJ th[e] case show that only one act of aggravated robbery occurred." Id. <I[ 19. 
14 
The defendant took both pieces of property-the car keys and the cash-in 
"a matter of seconds," and the entire episode lasted all of a "few minutes." Id. 
Because the taking of the money and the keys "was part of 'one intention, one G 
general impulse, and one plan,"' the defendant "committed only one aggra-
vated robbery." Id.; see Richardson, 489 S.E.2d at 700 ("[T]he question to be 
asked is whether the thefts, although occurring successively within a brief 
time frame, were part of one impulse."). 
Also closely on point is the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision in State v. 
Fischer, 368 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). In that case, the defendant 
stole a pickup truck with automotive tools in it. The truck would not run for 
long (it was later found "in the general vicinity'' of its "owner's residence"), 
but the defendant took the automotive tools from it and tried to sell them. Id. Q 
at 333. The defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of theft, one 
for the pickup truck and one for the automotive tools. Again, the court inval-
idated the second conviction. As it explained, "[t]he initial theft of the pickup 
truck was also a theft of everything that was in it at the time." Id. at 334. 
That the defendant eventually abandoned the truck because he "could not get 
[it] started" was of little moment-the critical point was that the single theft 
the defendant committed was of "the truck and its contents." Id. 
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Here, the single larceny doctrine dictates that convicting Mr. Bell of 
two counts of aggravated robbery was contrary to the law. In analyzing the 
factors courts consider in determining whether the doctrine applies, they 
weigh heavily in Mr. Bell's favor. First, the items taken were in the same lo-
cation. The purse was located inside the car. Mr. Bell had to enter the car to 
have access to the purse. Everything happened inside of a single, enclosed 
location. Second, there was no lapse of time between taking the purse and 
car. In truth, the car never was taken, as Mr. Bell had the wrong keys and it 
was impossible for him to take the car. Still, Mr. Bell's entry of the car and 
picking up the purse happened within seconds of each other. This is not a 
case where any appreciable time elapsed between two different events. 
Third, Ms. Ruiz was the owner of both the car and the purse. She was the on-
ly victim of any robbery by Mr. Bell. Finally, there were no intervening 
events between the takings. Mr. Bell entered the car, fished around for the 
ignition, picked up the purse, and exited the car. There was no break in be-
tween. All of Mr. Bell's actions were part of one continuous episode that last-
ed only a matter of seconds. 
Review of the facts in Irvin and Fischer makes it clear that application 
of the single larceny doctrine is even more appropriate in this case than in 
16 
those cases. In Irvin, the defendant brandished a knife and demanded the 
contents of a cash register from the clerk at a convenience store. The defend-
ant then locked the clerk in a back room. After the clerk was locked up, the ~ 
defendant left and took the clerk's car. The intervening act of locking the 
clerk in the back room was not enough to create two separate robberies. In 
the present case, there was no similar break in the action. Mr. Bell sat in the 
car for a few moments fumbling with the wrong keys, then took a purse from 
the car and left. It was all part of one impulse, with nothing else occurring in 
the interim. 
In Fischer, the defendant took tools from a truck he stole after he had 
to leave the truck behind because it would no longer run. The fact that he 
first drove away with the truck and then later carried off items that were in- Q 
side the truck did not create two different thefts. The intent to take the 
truck-even though the truck stopped working and the defendant ultimately 
could not drive it-constituted an attempt to take everything inside the 
truck. Here, Mr. Bell did not go nearly as far as the defendant in Fischer. 
Mr. Bell never turned the car on or drove it anywhere. The State contended 
that Mr. Bell intended to steal Ms. Ruiz's car when he opened the door and 
got inside. The jury agreed and convicted Mr. Bell. This intent necessarily 
17 
encompassed all items within the car, including Ms. Ruiz's purse. In short, 
the law only allows one charge of aggravated robbery on these facts, not two. 
Given the applicability of the single larceny doctrine, it is clear that Mr. 
Bell was greatly prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel and/or plain 
error. The harm is obvious-he was convicted of two felonies when it should 
have been, at most, one. Mr. Bell was sentenced to two terms of five years to 
life in prison when it should have been, at most, one. The matrix calculated 
by the Board of Pardons and Parole to determine Mr. Bell's time behind bars 
accounts for two first degree felonies instead of just one. The Court should 
vacate one of Mr. Bell's convictions for aggravated robbery. 
B. Allowing Mr. Bell to be Tried and Convicted of Two 
Counts of Aggravated Robbery Constituted Ineffective As-
sistance of Counsel, Plain Error, or Both. 
The Court allowed two counts of aggravated robbery to go to the jury 
and imposed two sentences after the jury convicted Mr. Bell of both counts. 
While Mr. Bell's trial counsel argued that Mr. Bell should not be convicted of 
any crimes, counsel did not object to Mr. Bell being charged with two counts 
of aggravated robbery or the district court's instruction to the jury that it 
could convict Mr. Bell of two counts of aggravated robbery. The resulting 
harm to Mr. Bell from this ineffective assistance and plain error is obvious. 
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If the jury only had the ability to convict him of one count of aggravated rob-
bery, he would have one less felony on his record. His prison time would be 
reduced, and his path to rehabilitation would be greatly eased. 
1. Ineffective Assistance 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right "to 
have the assistance of counsel for [their] defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In 
Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that a per-
son is denied his or her Sixth Amendment right to the "assistance of counsel" 
if counsel fails to provide "reasonably effective assistance" and the defendant 
can show that, but for that failure, "the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). In short, an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim has two components-deficient "performance" and re- ~ 
sulting "prejudice." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, <JI 85, 150 P.3d 480. Mr. 
Bell satisfies both components here. 
Utah courts presume that counsel performs reasonably and have often 
stated that counsel does not perform deficiently as long as his or her actions 
are part of "an acceptable trial strategy." State v. Graham, 2013 UT App 73, 
<I[ 15, 299 P.3d 644. No matter how strong the presumption in favor of trial 
counsel, however, this much is clear: counsel performs deficiently if his or G;; 
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her actions "cannot be construed to be a component of any rational defense 
strategy." State V. Ott, 2010 UT 1, en 37, 247 P.3d 344. 
Whether defense counsel has followed a rational strategy at trial de-
pends on the circumstances of the case. See State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, 
en 17, 248 P.3d 70 (holding that, "under the circumstances, counsel's failure to 
request an instruction that provided a clear explanation that the burden ac-
tually shifted to the State to disprove the defense ... cannot be attributed to 
any reasonable trial strategy" (emphasis added)). A reasonable defense 
strategy in one case may just as easily be an unreasonable defense strategy 
in the next case, largely depending on the actions taken and strategy adopted 
by the prosecutor. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ("Representation is an art, 
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or 
even brilliant in another."). 
One manner in vv:hich counsel can perform deficiently is by failing to 
"thorough[ly] investigat[e]" the law. Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, en 140, 
267 P.3d 232; see United States v. Demeree, 108 F. App'x 602, 605 (10th Cir. 
2004) ("Although we do not require clairvoyance, counsel is obligated to re-
search relevant law to make an informed decision whether certain avenues 
will be fruitful."). In the recent words of the U.S. Supreme Court, "[a]n attor-
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ney's ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined 
with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential 
example of unreasonable performance under Strickland." Hinton v. Alabama, Q 
134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014). 
Here, certainly no "acceptable trial strategy" would have led defense 
counsel to allow Mr. Bell to face two counts of aggravated robbery when he 
should have faced only one. No set of circumstances exists in which defend-
ing against two felonies is better than defending against one. The obvious 
risk is that the jury might convict on both counts, which is precisely what 
happened here. It appears that defense counsel was not aware of the single 
larceny doctrine, discussed infra. Defense counsel never made the argument 
Q 
that only one aggravated robbery count should go forward and never objected G 
to the judge instructing the jury on two counts. Regardless of counsel's un-
derstanding of the law, there was no legitimate basis _for allowing two counts, 
and the failure to object to this constituted deficient performance. See Hin-
ton, 134 S. Ct. at 1089. 
2. Plain Error. 
"To succeed under the plain error exception, a party must demonstrate 
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial G 
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court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasona-
ble likelihood of a more favorable outcome." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan 
River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, <J{ 147, 299 P.3d 990. The plain error 
standard is similar to the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, 
e.g., State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, <JI 63, 55 P.3d 573. 
As described in detail below, it was error for the district court to allow 
Mr. Bell to face two counts of aggravated robbery, to instruct the jury that it 
could convict Mr. Bell on two counts of aggravated robbery, and to sentence 
Mr. Bell for two counts of aggravated robbery. The error should have been 
obvious because controlling precedent holds that two counts of aggravated 
robbery may not be charged for the kind of single-impulse actions that hap-
pened here. The single larceny doctrine, as established by controlling Utah 
case law, dictates that the circumstances giving rise to the criminal allega-
tions against Mr. Bell only justify one count of aggravated robbery, not two. 
The harm from the error was the most serious harm possible. The jury con-
victed Mr. Bell of two counts of aggravated robbery when it should only have 
had the ability to, at most, convict for one. 
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II. IT WAS ERROR TO CONVICT MR. BELL OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY WHEN IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO TAKE 
THE CAR AT ISSUE. 
Even if it was appropriate to charge Mr. Bell with two counts of aggra- ~ 
vated robbery (which it was not), the conviction for aggravated robbery of the 
car cannot stand. According to the prosecution, Mr. Bell committed aggra-
vated robbery when he sat inside the car and unsuccessfully looked for the 
ignition, then brandished a knife when confronted by the car owner and her 
friends. The snag in this theory is that it was impossible for Mr. Bell to take 
the car. He never had the keys to it and had no ability to turn the car on. On 
this evidence, the most Mr. Bell could be convicted of was attempted robbery, 
not aggravated robbery. The conviction for aggravated robbery of the car 
must be vacated. 
A. Allowing Mr. Bell to be Tried and Convicted of Aggravated 
Robbery Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel or 
Plain Error or Both. 
As set forth above, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two 
components-deficient "performance" and resulting "prejudice." Menzies, 
2006 UT 81, <JI 85. Mr. Bell's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
not presenting an argument based on factual impossibility and by not re-
f;"; 
~ 
questing a jury instruction regarding factual impossibility. It was also inef- GJ 
fective assistance not to contest Mr. Bell's conviction for aggravated robbery 
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based on the car. Mr. Bell had no ability to take the car because he had the 
wrong keys. He literally could not accomplish the robbery even if he wanted 
..; to (which the jury found that he did). The law allows a defense of factual im-
possibility in such circumstances. There was no sufficient reason for Mr. 
Bell's trial counsel not to press this defense. 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support a Count of Aggravated 
Robbery Related to the Car. 
While factual impossibility is not a defense to a crime charged as an at-
tempt, see Utah Code § 76-4-101(3)(b) ("A defense to the offense of attempt 
does not arise . . . due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have 
been committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed 
them to be."), Mr. Bell was not charged with an attempt crime. The State de-
cided to pursue aggravated robbery rather than attempted robbery under sec-
tion 76-4-101 (which would have been a second-degree felony under section 
..;J 76-4-102). Aggravated robbery is a first-degree felony. Utah Code § 76-6-
302. 
The aggravated robbery statute does not contain a prohibition against 
the defense of factual or legal impossibility. "When interpreting statutes," 
the "primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the legislature." 
State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, il 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (citation omitted). Legisla-
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tive intent is discerned by first looking at the plain language of the statute 
itself. Id. It should be assumed that the legislature used each term advised-
ly. Id. Applying these basic principles of statutory interpretation, the fact G 
that the prohibition against a factual impossibility defense is not found in the 
robbery or aggravated robbery statutes means that the defense is available. 
The Legislature could have included the prohibition on the factual impossibil-
ity defense in the aggravated robbery statue itself, but it chose not to. Thus, 
factual impossibility applies here and requires vacation of Mr. Bell's convic-
tion for aggravated robbery. 
The case of State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991), is illustrative. 
In Johnson, the defendant was convicted of several counts of attempted first-
degree murder of her husband. One of these charges stemmed from the de- G 
fondant's attempts to poison her husband using a substance called oxalic ac-
id. Id. at 1153. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the State did not prove 
that the oxalic acid was actually a poison or lethal substance or that Johnson 
had administered it in amounts that would be lethal to her husband. Id. at 
1158. The State had contended that it did not matter if it had proved these 
facts because, under the attempt statute, factual impossibility was no de-
fense. Id. In other words, according to the State, the fact that the defendant G 
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had intended to poison her husband was enough to convict her, even if her at-
tempt had no chance of succeeding. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and stated: 
We agree that under [the attempt] statute factual impossi-
bility generally is no defense to an attempt charge. However, 
where the charge is attempted first degree murder, which is dis-
tinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from attempted second 
degree murder only by the presence of specified objective aggra-
vating circumstances, the legislature must have intended that 
the aggravating circumstances actually be present. Therefore, a 
subjective mistake by the actor as to the presence of an aggravat-
ing circumstance required by section 76-5-202(1) would be a de-
fense to a charge of attempted first degree murder. 
Id. at 1158. Similarly, the plain language of the aggravated robbery statute 
under which Mr. Bell was charged has specific requirements. In contrast to 
the general attempt statute, it does not proscribe factual impossibility as a 
defense. This makes it even more appropriate here than in Johnson to vacate 
the conviction. In this case, the crime was not brought as an attempt offense. 
Mr. Bell was charged and convicted of taking a car that he did not have the 
ability to take. 
An examination of the applicable law and facts in this case demon-
strates that it was indeed factually impossible for Mr. Bell to have committed 
the aggravated robbery of the car. An aggravated robbery is a robbery com-
mitted with a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code § 76-6-302. A robbery is 
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committed when one uses force or fear of immediate force in the course of a 
theft or wrongful appropriate. See id. § 76-6-301. Both theft and wrongful 
appropriation include obtaining unauthorized control over the property of an- ~ 
other. See id. §§ 76-6-404, 76-6-404.5. Mr. Bell never obtained control over 
Ms. Ruiz's car because he never had the keys to Ms. Ruiz's car. The keys that 
Mr. Bell found in the car were for a separate rental car. The keys to Ms. 
Ruiz's car were safely in Ms. Aragon's purse the entire time and never in Mr. 
Bell's possession. For that matter, the car ignition was not a traditional one 
into which Mr. Bell could have tried to force the wrong keys. The car had a 
new type of ignition that would only work if the proper keys were inside the 
car.
2 There was literally no way Mr. Bell could have taken the car because he 
did not have the necessary instruments to turn the car on. It was physically Q 
impossible for Mr. Bell to take Ms. Ruiz's car. Not surprisingly, he quickly 
exited the car and never obtained possession of it. 
Given these facts, it was inappropriate for the jury to convict Mr. Bell 
for a crime that it was impossible for him to actually commit. The prejudice 
to Mr. Bell is clear, as described above. He was convicted of two counts of ag-
2 In addition to it being impossible to start the car with the wrong keys in the G;; 
ignition, there was no evidence presented at trial that Mr. Bell attempted to 
do such a thing or intended to make such an attempt. 
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gravated robbery when he only should have been on trial for one count relat-
ed to Ms. Ruiz's purse. It was impossible for Mr. Bell to take Ms. Ruiz's car, 
vJ yet he was still convicted for aggravated robbery of the car. Thus, it was inef-
fective assistance for trial counsel not to object to the second aggravated rob-
bery count and not to present the factual impossibility defense to the jury. It 
was also ineffective assistance not to raise any objections to second aggravat-
ed robbery conviction by the jury. The aggravated robbery conviction related 
to the car should be vacated. 
III. IN LIGHT OF MR. BELL'S VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION, 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
~ JURY'S FINDING THAT MR. BELL HAD THE SPECIFIC IN-
TENT TO COMMIT AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The State did not put on sufficient evidence to overcome Mr. Bell's de-
fense that voluntary intoxication caused him to not have the requisite intent 
to commit aggravated robbery. While Mr. Bell's trial counsel argued that Mr. 
~ Bell should be acquitted due to voluntary intoxication, counsel did not pre-
serve the argument that the State's evidence on this topic was insufficient. 
This constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As set out above, an inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim has two components-deficient "perfor-
mance" and resulting "prejudice." Menzies, 2006 UT 81, <J[ 85. Mr. Bell satis-
fies both components here. 
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Mr. Bell's trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to move for a di-
rected verdict or otherwise objecting to the sufficiency of the State's evidence 
regarding voluntary intoxication. There is no conceivable "trial strategy" that ~ 
would have led defense counsel to leave the sufficiency of the State's evidence 
unchallenged. See Graham, 2013 UT App 73, CJ[ 15. 
Defense counsel's failure to challenge the State's evidence prejudiced 
Mr. Bell. But for that error, "there is a reasonable probability that the ver-
dict would have been more favorable to the defendant." State v. Parker, 2000 
UT 51, <JI 10, 4 P.3d 778. If the district court had ruled that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to overcome the voluntary intoxication defense, then Mr. Bell 
would have been acquitted on both counts of aggravated robbery. He would 
not have been convicted of any felonies and would likely not be in prison. 
A. Marshaling Evidence 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Bell must "marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). In compliance with that requirement, Mr. Bell presents the follow-
ing evidence regarding voluntary intoxication and Mr. Bell's intent to commit 
aggravated robbery. 
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While at the cell phone store, Mr. Bell interacted with a store employee 
and was understandable and responded appropriately to questions. R. 124 at 
viJ 141-143. Mr. Bell testified that he did not recall anything about the alleged 
crimes, but he did remember some details about conversations with a friend 
beforehand, about drinking a beer beforehand, and going to the location 
where the crimes at issue were alleged to take place. R. 125 at 49-50. He al-
so remembered the tattoo of a hospital worker who attended to him after the 
police took him for medical attention. R. 125 at 46-4 7. 
While Ms. Bell was sitting in Ms. Ruiz's car, Ms. Ruiz and her friends 
approached the car and saw Mr. Bell holding the rental car keys and asking 
where the ignition was located. R. 124 at 90, 110, 123. Mr. Bell asked where 
the ignition was about three or four times, but he never found the ignition. 
R. 124 at 111, 125. 
After the women shouted for Mr. Bell to leave the car, Mr. Bell re-
sponded by pulling out a knife and pointing it at Ms. Aragon. R. 124 at 91, 
111, 125. After Ms. Aragon stepped away, Mr. Bell turned and pointed the 
knife at Ms. Ruiz, who was standing next to the passenger-side door. R. 124 
at 94, 111-112. Mr. Bell then picked up Ms. Ruiz's purse from the floor near 
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the front passenger seat of the car, and he exited the car. R. 124 at 95, 112, 
126, 145. 
After leaving the car, Mr. Bell dropped the knife and ran across the 
parking lot with the women and an employee of the store following him. R. 
124 at 95-96, 113, 127, 136, 146. Two onlookers in a car attempted to block Ci) 
Mr. Bell with the car and managed to dislodge the purse from him. R. 124 at 
96, 113, 127, 156, 172-173. They bumped Mr. Bell at least twice with the car, 
causing him to fall. R. 124 at 157-158. At one point, Mr. Bell asked the per-
son in the car who bumped him for a ride, but was refused. R. 124 at 158. 
Subsequently, Mr. Bell threw the rental car keys in nearby bushes. R. 124 at 
128-129; R. 125 at 18. Mr. Bell was eventually stopped and apprehended by 
the police. R. 124 at 96-97, 114, 128; R. 125 at 13-14. According to a police GJ 
detective, Mr. Bell later stated that he had tried to take a car. R. 125 at 32, 
34. 
B. The Evidence Introduced at Trial was Insufficient to Find 
that Mr. Bell Had the Requisite Intent, Given His Intoxi-
cated Condition. 
There is a reasonable probability that, had defense counsel challenged 
the sufficiency of the State's evidence at trial, the outcome would have been 
Q 
different. The State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. ~ 
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Bell had the specific intent to commit aggravated robbery, given his intoxi-
cated state. 
With the only direct evidence of Mr. Bell's intent being his testimony 
that he did not intend to commit any crimes and has no memory of doing so, 
the State was forced to rely on Mr. Bell's actions and the surrounding cir-
cumstances to prove Mr. Bell's mental state. But as the Utah Supreme Court 
explained some time ago, a person's actions do not themselves "raise the pre-
sumption that [they] were done with the specific intent required to prove the 
offense." State v. Castonguay, 663 P .·2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added). Instead, "[a]ll the circumstances, when taken together, must admit of 
no other hypothesis than of guilt to warrant conviction." Id. 
"[W]hen intoxication ... negates the existence of the state of mind re-
quired for the commission of the crime, the act or omission which otherwise 
would constitute an offense is purged of its criminality." State v. Potter, 627 
P.2d 75, 79 (Utah 1981); see also Utah Code § 76-2-306. In order for intoxica-
tion to be a valid defense, "one must be so under the influence of alcohol [or 
drugs] that at the time of the alleged offense, he was then and there incapa-
ble of forming the necessary intent, namely, having a conscious objective or 
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desire" to engage in the criminal conduct. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 
(Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981)). 
Evidence of intoxication must have relevance to the defendant's mental ~ 
state at the time of the crime. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah 1982). 
For the defense to be successful, it is necessary to show more than the de- Q 
fondant had been drinking or using drugs. See id. It is necessary to show 
that the defendant's mind was affected to such an extent that he did not have 
the capacity to form the requisite specific intent or purpose to commit rob-
bery. See id. 
The defense of voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent 
crimes if it serves to negate the mens rea element. Adams v. State, 2005 UT 
62, 'Il 22, 123 P.3d 400. Aggravated robbery is a specific intent crime. See G.J 
Utah Code §§ 76-6-301, -302; Potter, 627 P.2d at 78. In Adams, the defendant 
sought post-conviction relief after being convicted of rape. Adams, 2005 UT 
62, 'Il 2. The defendant alleged that he was drunk to the point of losing the 
ability to comprehend his circumstances, identity, and all memory of events 
in his inebriated state. The trial transcript indicated that both he and his 
former girlfriend testified to his drunkenness at trial. Id. 'Il 22. The Supreme 
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Court determined that the defendant's voluntary intoxication defense was po-
tentially meritorious and reversed to require a hearing on the subject. Id. 
Here, Mr. Bell testified that immediately after the events at issue took 
place, he did not recall anything about the alleged crimes due to his intoxi-
cated state. R. 125 at 46-50. Like the defendant in Adams, Mr. Bell's con-
sumption of drugs and alcohol deprived him of the ability to comprehend the 
circumstances or even remember his own actions. Mr. Bell's testimony and 
the testimony of several witnesses revealed Mr. Bell's highly intoxicated 
state. A witness testified that she saw Mr. Bell fall down twice in the park-
ing lot prior to the incident, just while walking. R. 124 at 180. R. 124 at 99-
101, 152. Another witness testified that Mr. Bell looked like a 'Junkie" in bad 
physical condition. R. 124 at 160. Inside the store, Mr. Bell was talking loud-
ly, using excessive amounts of hand sanitizer, repeatedly lifting up his shirt, 
and talking to himself. R. 124 at 100-102, 107-108, 122, 151. When Mr. Bell 
held up his hand as if to show something to the store manager, there was 
nothing in his hand. R. 124 at 153. The store manager thought Mr. Bell was 
high. R. 124 at 151-152. A witness testified that Mr. Bell acted erratically, 
"all over the place." R. 124 at 160, 180, 189. After being arrested, Mr. Bell 
told police officers that he was on methamphetamine and that he had not 
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slept for three days. R. 125 at 23. Mr. Bell answered police officer questions, 
but he was moaning while he was asked questions. R. 125 at 24-25. Mr. Bell 
vomited at the police station and was eventually taken to the hospital. R. 
125 at 23-24, 32-33. The police sent Mr. Bell to the hospital because they be-
lieved the jail would not accept Mr. Bell in his condition. R. 125 at 32-33. 
This testimony from multiple witnesses demonstrates the severe na-
ture of Mr. Bell's impairment. Mr. Bell's erratic behavior confirms his testi-
mony that he did not know what he was doing during the events in question. 
The evidence presented by the State was insufficient to show that Mr. Bell 
acted intentionally, despite being intoxicated. In its closing argument, the 
State focused on the fact that Mr. Bell had some memories of that day, like of 
a hospital worker with a tattoo. The State suggested that Mr. Bell conven- G;; 
iently only remembered facts unrelated to the crimes he was charged with. 
But this type of argument is not evidence. If anything, the fact that Mr. Bell 
remembered some pieces of events bolsters his credibility and showed that he 
was making a candid attempt to recollect all that he could. No evidence pre-
sented by the State indicated that at the critical time-when Mr. Bell en-
tered and sat in Ms. Ruiz's car with a knife-that he was in control of his 
mental faculties. 
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The State focused on some of Mr. Bell's interactions with others to 
show that he must have known what he was doing. But the evidence cited by 
the State actually supports Mr. Bell's testimony that he was not acting ra-
tionally and was not in control of himself. The State argued that Mr. Bell's 
request for a ride from the person who bumped him with a car showed that 
he knew enough to try to escape. To the contrary, requesting a ride from a 
person who has bumped you with a car makes no sense at all. The person 
was clearly trying to stop Mr. Bell and not assist him. To ask for a ride in 
that situation indicates Mr. Bell did not have his senses about him and could 
not think clearly. Similarly, the State argued that Mr. Bell asking Ms. Ruiz 
and Ms. Aragon where the ignition was located shows that he was aware 
enough to try to turn the car on. But asking that question of alleged robbery 
victims who are shouting to get out of their car is not rational behavior. It 
demonstrates an inability to comprehend the situation. Clearly, the women 
were not going to help Mr. Bell and did not want him there. Mr. Bell's com-
munications indicate he did not comprehend this basic fact. 
The State also made much of Mr. Bell's alleged ability to converse ap-
propriately with the store employee. Although the store employee said Mr. 
Bell answered questions as if he understood them, the same employee testi-
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fied that Mr. Bell was acting unusually, using excessive amounts of hand 
sanitizer and raising his hand to show him an object that did not exist. The 
store employee believed Mr. Bell was high. Similarly, a police officer testified ~ 
that Mr. Bell said he tried to steal a car, but the same officer said that Mr. 
Bell was moaning while responding and vomited in the holding cell. The Q 
same officer requested that Mr. Bell be transported to the hospital because he 
did not believe the jail would accept him given his condition. 
Taking the evidence as a whole, the picture becomes clear that Mr. Bell 
was severely intoxicated and not in his right mind. He did not have control of 
his mental facilities. The testimony of numerous witnesses, including the 
testimony emphasized by the State, only corroborates Mr. Bell's testimony 
that he was not making knowing or intentional decisions at the time in ques- GJ 
tion due to his intoxication. Simply put, Mr. Bell did not have the ability to 
intentionally commit aggravated robbery. Accordingly, there was insufficient 
evidence to support his convictions, and this Court should vacate them. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse Mr. Bell convictions for two 
counts of aggravated robbery. 
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DATED this 9th day of March, 2015. 
SCOTTS.B L 
NICOLE G. FARRELL 
ALAN S. MOURITSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Addendum A 
" 
. ., 3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYCE D BELI,, 
Defendant. 
custody: Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: magdalea 
Prosecutor: EVBRSHED, NATHAN J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date o.f birth: December 15, 1982 
Sheriff Office#: 253621 
Aud.io 
MINOTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
case No: 131904431 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W REESE 
Date: December 2, 2013 
ANDREA J 
Tape Number: S-45 Tape Count: 12:27 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2013 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2013 Guilty 
3. THREAT/USE OF D~GBROUS ,nm.PO~ IN FIGHT. - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/09/2013 Guilty · 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
SENTENCE PRJ:SON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate tel:111 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on .the defendant's conviction of THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS 
WEAPON ~N FXGHT a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed one year in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation·to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Printed: 12/09/13 09:18:50 Page 1 
-· - -
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. 
~ase No: 131904431 Dat·e: Dec 02, 2013 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison time to run concurrent. 
Date: __ _/)_,_L_. _r_,_/_z._oJ3 
Printed: 12/09/13 09:18:50 Page 2 (last) . 
.... -- -
AddendumB 
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.,,, 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Amend .... 
!United States Code Annotated 
!Constitution of the United States 
I Annotated 
!Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
U.S.CA. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
Currentness 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions for 
subdivisions I through XX are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXI through 
XXIX, see the second document for Amend. VI. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII, 
see the third document for Amend. VI.> 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Notes of Decisions (5159) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials, USCA CONST Amend. VI-Jury Trials 
Current through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, 113-291, and 113-295) approved 12-19-2014 
Egd of Document .r,, 2015 Thc.lll1son Reuters. No claim 10 original U.S. Government Works. 
\11✓estlav-1Nexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
Utah Code ~ 
76-2-306 Voluntary intoxication. 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if 
recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware Q 
of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that 
offense. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Page 1 
~ Utah Code 
76-4-101 Attempt -- Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime; and 
(b) 
(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly corroborates the 
actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (1 )(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant . 
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be. 
Amended by Chapter 154, 2004 General Session 
Page 1 
Utah Code 
76-4-102 Attempt -- Classification of offenses. 
(1) Criminal attempt to commit: 
(a) 
(i) a capital felony, or a felony punishable by imprisonment for life without parole, is a first 
degree felony; 
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (2), an attempt to commit aggravated murder, Section 
76-5-202, which results in serious bodily injury, is punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not fewer than 15 years and which may be for life; 
{b) except as provided in Subsection (1)(c) or (d), a first degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(c) any of the following offenses is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not fewer than three years and which may be for life: 
(i) murder, Subsection 76-5-203(2)(a); 
(ii) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (1 )(d), any of the felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Part 4, Sexual Offenses, that are first degree felonies; 
(d) except as provided in Subsection (3), any of the following offenses is a first degree felony, 
punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and which may be for life: 
(i) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(ii) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; or 
(iii) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
( e) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(f) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(g) a class A misdemeanor is a class 8 misdemeanor; 
(h) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; and 
(i) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one half the penalty for a 
class C misdemeanor. 
(2) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii), a court finds that a lesser term than 
the term described in Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) is in the interests of justice and the court states the 
reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less 
than: 
(a) 10 years and which may be for life; or 
(b) six years and which may be for life. 
(3) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (1 )(d), a court finds that a lesser term than the 
term described in Subsection (1 )(d) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for this 
finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than: 
(a) 10 years and which may be for life; 
(b) six years and which may be for life; or 
(c) three years and which may be for life. 
Amended by Chapter 93, 2013 General Session 
Page 1 
vi) Utah Code 
76-6-301 Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of 
the personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in 
the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. · 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation" if it 
occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Amended by Chapter 112, 2004 General Session 
Page 1 
Utah Code 
76-6-302 Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing 
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session 
Page 1 
Q 
~ Utah Code 
75:5.404 Theft -- Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Page 1 
Utah Code 
76-6-404.5 Wrongful appropriation -- Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to 
temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or 
legal custodian of possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control by the actor is not 
presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous 
occasion to the control of the property by any person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as provided in Section 
76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a third degree felony if it 
is wrongful appropriation; 
{b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it 
is wrongful appropriation; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class B misdemeanor 
if it is wrongful appropriation; and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class C misdemeanor 
if it is wrongful appropriation. 
(4) Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft under Section 
76-6-404. 
Amended by Chapter 48, 2001 General Session 
Page 1 
Addendum C 
SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
PETER D. LEAVITT, Bar No. 11407 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (80 I )363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYCEDBELL 
DOB: 12/15/1982, 
AKA: . 
2105 Summer Ridge Way #11 
Taylorsville, UT 84129 
D.L.# 166269841 
OTN 
SO# 
Defendant. 
Assigned to: PETER D. LEA VITT 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
DAO# 13009747 
Case No. 131904431 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written declaration states on 
information and belief that the defendant, BRYCE D BELL, committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 76-6-302 UCA, First Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about 
May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant 
did (1 )(a) unlawfully and intentionally take or attempt to take personal property in the possession 
of another from his or her person, or immediate presence, against his or her will, by means of 
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person pennanently or temporarily of 
the personal property; or 
(b) intentionally or knowingly use force or fear of immediate force against another in the course 
of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation; and in the course of committing said robbery; 
and 
(2) in the course of committing the before mentioned act, 
(a) used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon; 
(b) caused serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle. 
.... -- ........ 
STATE vs BRYCE D BELL 
DAO# 13009747 
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COUNT2 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 76-6-302 UCA, First Degree Felony, as follows; That on or about 
May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, Stat~ of Utah, the defendant 
did (l)(a) unlawfully and intentionally take or attempt to take personal property in the possession 
of another from his or her person, or immediate presence, against his or her will, by means of 
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of 
the personal property; or 
(b) intentionaHy or knowingly use force or fear of immediate force against another in the course 
of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation; and in the course of committing said robbery; 
and 
(2) in the course of committing the before mentioned act, 
(a) used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon; 
(b) caused serious bodily injury upon another; or 
( c) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle. 
COUNT3 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 76-5-103(1) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or 
about May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant did commit assault as defined in Utah Code Section 76-5-102 and used 
( a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601 ; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
COUNT4 
INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER, 76-8-305 UCA, Class B Misdemeanor, as 
follows: That on or about May 05, 2013 at 5500 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant did have knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should 
have knowledge, that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the 
defendant or another and interfered with the arrest or detention by: 
(I) the use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perfonn any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and · 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Ben Pender, Moriah Aragon, Shaylynn Balfour, Blake Beynon, Kendra Christensen, J. 
Ellis, John Kelly, Stephanie Murray, Ben Pender, Lisa Powell, Mario Rincon, Brenda Ruiz, 
Rebecca Sanborn, Robert Simpkins, Josep Tarraso, Hailee Walker, 
STA TE vs BRYCE D BELL 
DAO# 13.009747 
Page 3 
DECLi-\.RA TION OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your declarant bases this Information upon the following: 
The statement of Ms. M. Aragon that on May 5, 2013, she went to the AT&T store at 
5500 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, with her friends Ms. B. Ruiz and Ms. K. 
Christensen. Ms. Christensen noticed a male who was just inside the store was inside Ms. Ruiz 
vehicle. All three women responded to the vehicle. The male, later identified as the defendant 
here, BRYCE D. BELL, was attempting the start the vehicle. The women ordered the defendant 
to get out of the vehicle. The defendant displayed a knife to Ms. Aragon and Ms. Christensen, 
and then pointed the knife at Ms. Ruiz. The defendant then grabbed Ms. Ruiz purse, exited the 
vehicle, and began running. The women and other bystanders chased the defendant until police 
arrived. 
The statement of Officer J. Ellis with the Unified Police Department that on May 5, 2013, 
he responded to a report of a robbery at 5500 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County. Officer 
Ellis observed a male later identified as the defendant being followed by a group of people. 
Officer Ellis ordered the defendant to the ground several times and the defendant failed to 
comply. The defendant did get on his knees and Officer Ellis attempted to place the defendant in 
handcuffs. The defendant attempted to pull his hands away. The defendant was instructed to 
stop resisting. Officer Huggard assisted Officer Ellis and they were able to take the defendant 
into custody. During a search of the defendant Officer Ellis located a large black knife sheath on 
the defendant's belt. 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
SIM GILL, District Attorney 
Deputygmey 
10th day of July, 20 I 3 
MAH/ /DAO# 13009747 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705 
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
Executed on: 
Ben Pender 
Declarant 
----------
AddendumD 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. VERDICT 
BRYCE D. BELL, CASE NO: 131904431 
Defendant 
We, the jurors in the above case find verdicts against the defendant, BRYCE D. 
BELL, as follows: 
VER.I 
Count 1: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Not Guilty 
1!f-Giiilty 
Count 2: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
----,,- Not Guilty 
ff-Guilty 
Count 3: 
Not Guilty 
~ Guilty of BRANDISHING A DANGEROUS WEAPON IN A FIGHT OR {j_j QUARREL, a lesser included offense of Count 3 
__ Guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, as charged in the Information 
Count 4: JNTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER 
Not Guilty 
~Guilty 
Dated this· 4 day of October, 2013. 
~-
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